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Horkan: The Place of Trial of Contract and Tort Actions under the Montana
NOTE AND COMMENT
had occasion to give that meaning to the statutes. Admittedly,
considered in the abstract, such filing is a form of public assumption; but such an interpretation of the statutes would
violate their language which clearly indicates that they refer
to an already existing and completed marriage. One advancing this contention must also ignore all the arguments already
made in this comment: the language strongly negates such an
interpretation, which would facilitate an easy method of evasion
of Chapter 208, Laws of Montana 1947, and all the Montana
cases to date indicate that the court assumed that they had
stated the full scope of what will be deemed public assumption
under the marriage code. This argument is not an acceptable
basis for supporting the growing practice of marriage by contract.
Even if it be thought that the arguments advanced herein
against the marriage by contract are not conclusive, the most that
can be said for the validity of such a marriage is that it rests on
such doubtful grounds that no responsible lawyer should advise a client to resort to it. It would be well indeed if arrangements could be made for clarification of the question possibly
in the form of a declaratory judgment or by definitive legislative action.
Robert J. Webb.
THE PLACE OF TRIAL OF CONTRACT AND TORT
ACTIONS UNDER THE MONTANA VENUE STATUTES
The case of Hardenburg v. Hardenburg' decided by the
Supreme Court of Montana has created some doubt as to the
status of the law in Montana in regard to the "proper" place
for the trial of actions upon contracts and actions for torts.
Mr. Chief Justice Johnson in his dissenting opinion in the
case' stated:
". .. the majority dispose of the present controversy
without expressly reversing the law although they badly
unsettle it. While three members concur in the disposal
of the case the form of one member's concurrence .. .
does not fully indicate in what respects he agrees with
the extended treatise signed by the other two members
constituting the majority."
'(1944) 115 Mont. 469, 146 P.(2d) 151.
2The word "proper" is used here in the same sense as the word is used
in §§9097 and 9098 1I.C.M. 1935. See note 12 infra..
'Supra note (1) P. 496.
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Revised Codes of Montana 1935, Sections 9093 to 9095,
inclusive, require that actions for the recovery or partition of
or injury to real property, or of the determination of any
right therein or for the foreclosure of a lien or mortgage on
real property must be brought in the county in which the
property or some part thereof is situated ;4 that actions for the
recovery of a penalty or forfeiture imposed by the statute and
actions against public officers must be brought in the county
where the cause of action arose;' that actions against a county
must be brought in that county.! Section 9696 provides:
"In all other cases, the action shall be tried in the county in which the defendants, or any of them, may reside
at the commencement of the action, or where the plain,
tiff resides, and the defendants, or any of them, may be
found; or if none of the defendants reside in the state,
or, if residing in the state, the county in which they reside be unknown to the plaintiff, the same may be tried
in any county which the plaintiff may designate in his
complaint; and if any defendant or defendants may be
about to depart from the state, such action may be tried
in any county where either of the parties may reside,
or service be had. Actions upon contracts may be tried
in the county in which the contract was to be performed;
and actions for torts in the county where the tort was
committed; subject, however, to the power of the court to
change the place of trial, as provided in this code.'
As Mr. Chief Justice Johnson and Mr. Justice Adar
pointed out in their opinions in the Hardenburg case,8 the territorial legislature in 1871 altered the right of the defendant
to be sued in the county of his residence by providing that
actions brought under the provisions of Section 9096 might also
be tried "where the plaintiff resides and the defendants or any
of them may be found"' and "actions upon contracts may be
tried in the county in which the contract was to be performed
and actions for torts in the county where the tort was committed. "'

The leading case involving the interpretation of the latter
provision is the case of the State ex rel. Interstate lumber Co.
"R.C.M. 1935, §9093.
'R.C.M. 1935, §9094.
OR.C.M. 1935, §9095.

'Italicized provisions added by way of amendment, LAws
1871, §25, p. 31.
1Supra note (1).
'Supra note (7).
'Supra note (7).
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v. District Court. The action was for the price of goods sold
and delivered. Plaintiff, seller, commenced the action against
the defendant, buyer, in Lewis and Clark County where the
goods had been sold and delivered. The defendant moved for
a change of place of trial to Silver Bow County, the county of
his residence. The Supreme Court by writ of supervisory control' annulled the order of the lower court directing a transfer
of the cause of action to Silver Bow County and in a unanimous
decision written by Mr. Chief Justice Brantly, after referring
to the general provision in the first sentence of Section 9096,
said:
".. . the last sentence, however, excepts out of the appli-

cation of this general provision actions upon contracts
and actions for torts, and requires the place of trial in
these cases to be determined by considerations wholly
apart from the residence and whereabouts of defendant."
".. . To determine, then, whether an action in either of

these two classes has been commenced in the proper county, the only question the court may consider and determine is where, in the one case, the contract was to be performed, or, in the other where the tort was committed."
"... The term "contract " as used in the statute, not
being limited in meaning, either by the context or by any
qualifying word, must be accepted in its broadest signification and as including every kind of contract whether express or implied."
The court in reaching its decision reasoned that unless the permissive auxiliary "may" as used in the second sentence of Section 9096 were given the force of "must," expressive of obligation and necessity, the provision contained in that sentence
would become meaningless when construed in conjunction with
Section 9097.' The court evidently assumed that if the provin(1918) 54 Mont. 602, 172 P. 1030.
'It is now well settled that an order denying a motion for a change of
place of trial is appealable. R.C.M. 1935, §9732, (3) ; Dawson v. Dawson (1932) 92 Mont. 46, 10 P.(2d) 381.
'Cited as R.C.M. 1907, §6504; RLC.M. 1935, §9097 provided: "If the
county in which the action is commenced is not the proper county for
trial thereof. the action may, notwithstanding, be tried therein, unless
the defendant, at the time he appears and answers or demurs, files an
affidavit of merits, and demands in writing, that the trial be held in
the proper county."
As amended by LAWS OF MONTANA 1943, Ch. 140, §1, §9097 now provides: "If the county in which the action is commenced is not the
proper county for the trial thereof, the action may notwithstanding,
be tried therein, unless the defendant at the time he makes his general
appearance in the case, by answer, demurrer or otherwise, files an af-
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sion of the second sentence of Section 9096 was permissive in
character, the county where the contract was to be performed
or where the tort was committed would not be a proper county
for the place of trial under the provisions of Section 9097, and
the cause of action would be subject to a motion by defendant
for a change of place of trial to the proper county, which would
place the action back under the operation of the general provision in the first sentence of Section 9096 which was mandatory
in character. Interpreted in this manner, a party commencing
an action possessed no greater right than that already possessed
under Section 9097, for under that code provision the party had
the right to commence a contract or tort action in any county in
the state subject to defendant's right to have the same removed
to the proper county. Hence, in order to give the provision
force and thereby carry out the legislative intent, the court held
that the auxiliary "may" should have the force of "must." The
court having taken this first step faced two mandatory provisions in the same statute concerning the same two classes of
cases and found it necessary to remove actions upon contracts
and actions for torts entirely out of the operation of the provisions found in the first sentence in order to make the two
sentences harmonious and import an intelligent meaning to the
statute.
The court admitted that its decisions up to this time had not
been harmonious and referred to two prior decisions" as having
impliedly adopted the same construction of the contract and
tort provision of Section 9096 by refusing to recognize the residence of the defendant as a material consideration. The court
5
specifically overruled three prior decisions"
insofar as they conflicted with its holding and stated that in deciding these cases
the court had followed California decisions which were not applicable since the comparable California code section did not
contain the contract and tort provision found in Section 9096.
The interpretation of the contract and tort provision of
Section 9096 set forth in the Interstate Lumber Co. case was folfidavit of merits, and demands in writing, that the trial be had in the

proper county."
"Oels v. Helena and Livingston S. and R. Co. (1891) 10 Mont. 524, 25
P. 1000; State ex rel. Coburn v. District Court (1910) 41 Mont. 84,

108 P. 144.
"Wallace v. Owsley (1891) 11 Mont. 219, 27 P. 790; McDonnell v. Collins (1897) 19 Mont. 372, 48 P. 549; Bond v. Hurd (1904) 31 Mont. 314,
78 P. 579, 3 Ann. Cas. 566.
'Cal. C. Civ. Proc. §395.
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lowed by a long line of decisions both in the contract field"'
and in the tort field' up to the time of the Hardenburg case.
Although Mr. Justice Adair, in his opinion in the Hardenburg
case, cited the cases of McKinney v. Mires' and Feldman v. Security State Bank' as holding that the defendant's residence
regulated the venue in actions upon contracts, the court in the
McKinney case disinguished its holding and stated that if plaintiff's suit was upon the alleged contract the proper county for
trial would be where the contract was to be performed. However,
plaintiff's suit was to declare and enforce a trust as to partnership property, compel an accounting as to joint profits and expenditures and to have injunctive relief, and proof of the contract was but incidental to the establishment of the trust. Therefore, the place of trial was governed by the general provision
contained in the first sentence of Section 9096. In the Feldman case the court stated that the proper county for trial was
where the contract was to be performed and upheld defendant's
right to a change of place of trial to that county, which county,
by coincidence, was also the county of defendant's residence.
It should be noted that the right of defendant, set out in
Section 9097 and subdivision (1) of Section 9098,' to a change
of place of trial to the proper county, is based on the contention
"State ex rel Western Accident and Indemnity Co. v. District Court
(1918) 55 Mont. 330, 176 P. 613: Feldman v. Security State Bank
(1922) 52 Mont. 330, 206 P. 425; Hough v. Rocky Mountain Fire Insurance Co. (1924) 70 Mont. 244, 224 P. 858; Stiemke v. Jankovich
(1925) 72 Mont. 363, 233 P. 904; Silver v. Morin (1925) 74 Mont. 398,
240 P. 825; Courtney v. Gordon (1925) 74 Mont. 408, 241 P. 233; H.
Earl Clack v. Stanton (1935) 100 Mont. 26, 44 P.(2d) 1069. Kroehnke
v. Gold Creek Mining Co. (1936) 102 Mont. 21, 55 P.(2d) 678; Colbert
Drug Co. v. Electrical Products Consolidated (1937) 106 Mont. 11, 74
P.(2d) 437; Thomas v. Cloyd (1940) 120 Mont. 343, 100 P.(2d) 938.
6
" Dryer v. Director General of Railroads (1923) 66 Mont. 298, 213 P.
210; Atkinson v. Bonners Ferry Lumber Co. (1925) 74 Mont. 393, 240
P. 823; O'Hanion v. Great Northern Railway Co. (1926) 76 Mont. 128,
245 P. 518; Benjamin v. Crick (1933) 95 Mont. 390, 26 P.(2d) 369;
Johnson v. Crick (1933) 95 Mont. 388, 26 P.(2d) 369; Stewart v. First
National Bank and Trust Co. (1933) 93 Mont. 390, 18 P.(2d) 801;
Kolberg v. Greiner (1932) 91 Mont. 509, 8 P.(2d) 799; Maio v. Greene
(1943) 114 Mont. 481, 137 P.(2d) 670.
'9(1933) 95 Mont. 191, 26 P.(2d) 169.
20(1922) 62 Mont. 330, 206 P. 425.
'§9098 as far as it is material to this discussion provides:
"The court or judge must, on motion, change the place of trial in the
following cases:
1. When the county designated in the complaint is not the proper
county.
2. When there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be
had therein.
3. When the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would
be promoted by the change.
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that the plaintiff has chosen the wrong county for the commencement of his action, contrary to the provisions of Sections 9093
to 9096, inclusive.' The motion of defendant on this ground
must be made when he makes his general appearance' or his
motion comes too late. " The burden is upon the party moving
for a change of place of trial to disclose the facts that entitle
him to the change. ' Upon compliance with the statutes and a
proper showing that the action was commenced in the wrong
county defendant is entitled to a change to the proper county as
a matter of right.' This right of the defendant cannot be defeated, at the time his motion is made, by a counter-motion,
made by the plaintiff, for the court to retain the action upon the
ground of convenience of witnesses, or that a fair and impartial
trial cannot be had in the county to which the defendant seeks
to have the cause changed.' A motion upon the latter grounds,
set forth in subdivision (2) and (3) of Section 9098, can only be
made after the defendant has answered and the issues are
formed, the granting of the motion being within the discretion
of the trial court.'
The Hardenburg case' was an action for the breach of a
written contract of sale. The plaintiffs and the defendant had
been engaged in an outdoor advertising business in and around
the city of Missoula, and all were residents of that city at the
time they entered into the contract. The plaintiffs agreed to
convey their interest in the business to the defendant and to
instruct a Missoula bank to deliver a bill of sale of plaintiffs'
share, together with other papers, to the defendant, the bank
having possession of the bill of sale under an escrow agreement.
The defendant promised to pay to the plaintiffs $100.00 per
month so long as they or either of them should live and a reasonable attorney's fee in case of suit. The plaintiffs commenced
'McKinney v. Mires (1933) 95 Mont. 191, 26 P.(2d) 169.
2§9097 R.C.M. 1935, Supra note 12.
"Dawson v. Dawson (1932) 92 Mont. 46, 10 P.(2d) 381; McKinney v.
Mires (1933) 95 Mont. 191, 26 P.(2d) 169.
"Courtney v. Gordon (1925) 74 Mont. 408, 241 P. 233.
Feldman v. Security State Bank (1922) 62 Mont. 330, 206 P. 425; Maio
v. Greene (1943) 114 Mont. 481, 137 P.(2d) 670.
' 7Wallace v. Owsley (1891) 11 Mont. 219, 27 P. 790; State ex rel Stephens v. District Court (1911) 43 Mont. 571, 118 P. 268, Ann. Cas.
1912 C, 343; State ex rel. Interstate Lumber Co. v. District Court
(1918) 54 Mont. 602, 172 P. 1030; Maio v. Greene (1943) 114 Mont.
481, 137 P.(2d) 670.
'Dawson v. Dawson (1932) 92 Mont. 46, 10 P.(2d) 381; McKinney v.
Mires (1933) 95 Mont. 191, 26 P.(2d) 169; Archer v. Archer (1938)
106 Mont. 116, 75 P.(2d) 783; Maio v. Greene (1943) 114 Mont. 481,
137 P.(2d) 670.
"Supra note (1).
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the action in Richland County and in the complaint alleged,
"that at all times material to this cause of action, the plaintiffs
have been and now are both residing at Sidney, Richland County, Montana," and that certain installments were delinquent.
Process was served upon the defendant in Missoula County. At
the time of filing a general demurrer, defendant moved for a
change of place of trial to Missoula County upon the grounds
that he was a resident of Missoula County at the time of commencement of the action and that Missoula County was the
county in which the contract was to be performed. The plaintiffs contended the contract was to be performed in Richland
County and this contention was the only point in dispute. The
trial court denied the motion of the defendant for a change of
place of trial. This order was reversed on appeal to the Supreme
Court.
Although three members of the court considered Missoula
County as the place for performance of the contract, this was
not considered as controlling in the opinion written by Mr. Justice Adair, concurred in by Mr. Justice Anderson.
That opinion stated that the general rule governing venue
in civil actions is that the action shall be tried in the county in
which the defendant resides at the commencement of the action ;' that this general rule is set forth in the first sentence of
Section 9096 and applies to all actions upon contracts and for
torts, but such provisions are not exclusive, for a tort action may
also be tried in the county in which the tort was committed and
actions upon contracts may also be tried in the county in which
the contract was to be performed, provided the contract sued
upon indicates either in terms or by express implication therefrom, a particular county in which it was to be performed other
than the county in which the defendant may reside at the commencement of the action; that this particular county in which the
3ontract was to be performed must be fixed and certain at the
time of contracting; that the defendant was within the general
This is the prevailing code provision as to venue of transitory actions.
Roger Foster, Place of Trial, 44 HARv. L. REv. 41 (1931). In ond
portion of the opinion it was stated that this was the general common
law rule. This common law distinguished between transitory and
local actions. Contract and tort actions generally are classified as
transitory actions, and a transitory action at common law could be
brought in any county where jurisdiction could be obtained over the
person of the defendant and was not limited to the county of the defendant's residence. 1 CHrrrY ON PLEADINO 270, 271. The county of
trial as to local actions is largely regulated by statutes which are
declaratory of the common law. Roger Foster, Place of Tria, 44
H~Av. L. REv. 41. See §9093 R.C.M. 1935, Supra note 4.
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rule since the contract did not indicate a particular county in
which it was to be performed other than the county in which the
defendant resided at the commencement of the action; that the
last sentence of Section 9096 was an exception to the general
rule set forth in the first sentence of that section and the burden
was upon the plaintiff to show facts relied upon to bring himself within this exception.
The opinion disapproved of a line of decisions of the court31
holding that when a contract for the payment of a money obligation is silent as to the place of performance the presumption
is that payment is to be made at the creditor's residence or place
of business, and upon failure of the debtor to seek out his creditor for the purpose of making payment, the latter may sue in
the county of his residence or place of business, that county being the place for performance of the contract. The reason for
this disapproval was that the presumption was inconsistent with
and the antithesis of the general rule set forth in Section 9096
in that the residence or place of business of the plaintiff
creditor controlled the place of trial, whereas the general rule
made the defendant's residence controlling. However, the opinion made an exception in the case of over-the-counter sale of
goods, the seller's place of business being the place for payment
and performance and the county of the seller's place of business
was the county for place of trial in case of suit on the debt.
The opinion disapproved of the holding in the Interstate
Lumber Co. case construing the auxiliary "may" to mean
"must" and characterized that interpretation as judicial legislation prohibited by Article IV of the Montana Constitution.
Mr. Justice Morris in a separate opinion stated that it was
evident that the parties at the time of contracting intended Missoula County as the place for performance of the contract; that
he concurred in the result but he did not concur in all that was
said in the opinion by Mr. Justice Adair.
Two justices wrote separate dissenting opinions. Mr. Justice Erickson was satisfied that the court's interpretation of
Section 9096 in the Interstate Lumber Co. case was a correct
"State ex rel. Coburn v. District Court (1910) 41 Mont. 84, 108 P. 145;
State ex rel. Western Accident and Indemnity Co. v. District Court
(1918) 55 Mont. 330, 176 P. 613; Hough v. Rocky Mountain Fire Ins.
Co. 70 Mont. 244, 224 P. 858, citing §§7434 and 7435 R.C.M. 1935; Silver
v. Morin (1925) 74 Mont. 398, 240 P. 825. Limiting operation of the
rule to when the creditor is a resident of the state at the time of performance; Courtney v. Gordon (1925) 74 Mont. 408, 241 P. 223; Electrical Products v. Goldstein (1934) 97 Mont. 581, 36 P. (2d) 1033; H.
Earl Clack Co. v. Stanton (1935) 100 Mont. 27, 44 P.(2d) 1069.
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interpretation of that statute; that the place for defendant's
performance of the contract was Richland County, for the contract was silent in regard to place of payment and in a situation
of that kind the only place the defendant could make an effective tender was at the place provided by statute, the creditor's
place of residence, and that county was the proper place for
performance, and trial in case of non-performance.'
Mr. Chief Justice Johnson stated that the bench and bar
for some twenty-six years had regarded the holding in the Interstate case as settled law and dissented on the ground that the decision badly unsettled, without expressly reversing, the law and
that the bench and bar were entitled to rely upon some consistency in the decisions of the court. The Chief Justice pointed
out that there was only one "may" in the contract and tort
provision of Section 9096 and whatever its meaning as applied
to contract actions, that meaning must also be applied to tort
actions; that the court, composed of the same justices, some
eight months prior to their decision in the principal case, in the
case of Maio v. Greene' upheld the right of the defendant in a
tort action to a change of place of trial from the county in
which the plaintiff and defendant both resided to another
county in which the tort had been committed.
While the opinion of Mr. Justice Adair in the Hardenburg
case speaks in terms of the defendant's right to have the cause
tried in the county of his residence, in substance it enlarges upon
the plaintiff's right by making two other "proper counties"
for the trial of contract and tort actions: (1) the county of defendant's residence, (2) the county where the plaintiff resides
and the defendant may be found. However, the opinion limits
plaintiff's right in contract actions by the limitations and qualifications prevously set out in this comment.
Whether the court in future decisions would consider the
opinion as a controlling precedent' is doubtful in view of a later
"'The writer of this comment does not intend to set forth the contentions
for and against the use of the tender rule to determine the place for
performance of a contract for venue purposes. If the reader wishes
to pursue this subject further in addition to the cases cited in note 31
supra, the following citations may be of value: BEAIE, TRFATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS §335.1, citing Courtney v. Gordon (1925) 74 Mont. 408,
241 P. 233; Burr v. Western States L. Ins. Co. (1931) 211 Cal. 568,
296 P. 273; WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §1812; 26 CoL. L. REv. 904 (1926).
(1943) 114 Mont. 481; 137 P.(2d) 670.
4In Franz v. Listug (1937) 105 Mont. 499, 74 P.(2d) 1133, Mr. Justice
Anderson speaking of Montana Securities Co. v. Boldwyn Distributing
Corp. (1919) 56 Mont. 215, 182 P. 119, said: "That opinion was concurred in only as to the result by other members of the court, and ac-
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decision of the court in the case of Johnson v. Ogle' and the comments of the members of the court in that case concerning the
holding in the Hardenburgcase.
The case of Johnson v. Ogle' was an action for services rendered by plaintiff, realtor, in the sale of realty situated in Lake
County. Plaintiff commenced the action in Lake County and
summons was served upon the defendant in Stillwater County.
At the time of filing a general demurrer, defendant made demand for a change of venue and in support thereof made affidavit "that at the time of commencement of this action he was
and now is a bona fide resident of the town of Columbus, StillBefore the motion for change of
water County, Montana."
venue came on for hearing, plaintiff filed an affidavit stating
that by agreement of the parties the contract was to be performed in Lake County; that the property sold was in that
county and the contract beteen the parties was made there; that
defendant had been a resident of Lake County and as yet had
not established a residence in Stillwater County; that the witnesses reside in Lake County and the contract was breached
there. The defendant moved to strike the affidavit of plaintiff
from the files. The motion to strike was denied as well as the
motion for change of venue.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to
consider the trial court's action with respect to the motion to
strike, and held that in order for the defendant to show facts
entitling him, as of right, to a change of venue to Stillwater
County, it was incumbent upon him to show that the contract
sued upon was not to be performed in Lake County where the
action was commenced, and since the defendant failed to show
sufficient facts the order denying the motion for change of venue
was affirmed.
The decision is of value in this discussion because it refutes
certain language in the opinion of Mr. Justice Adair in the
Hardenburg case that the burden is upon the plaintiff to show
facts relied upon to bring himself within what that opinion
termed the performance exception to the general rule in Section
9096.
The decision is also of value because of the discussion of
the holding in the Hardenburgcase. Mr. Justice Morris stated
cordingly, what is said therein is not a controlling precedent." Of
three justices then on the bench, one wrote the decision, one concurred
in the result and one was absent.
(1945) 117 Mont. 419, 159 P.(2d) 337.
"Supra note 35.
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that his special concurring opinion in that case went no further
than to concur with the majority in holding that the venue of
the action was properly determined to be in Missoula County,
which was the only question presented by the controversy; that
in his opinion the Interstate Lumber Co. case remained the leading case on the question of venue in Montana, and correctly
construed Section 9096.
Mr. Justice Adair and Mr. Justice Angstman concurred
specially in the result in the Johnson case, but in separate opinions characterized the discussion of the holding in the Hardenburg case by the majority as gratuitous and obiter dictum. Mr.
Justice Adair stated that in his opinion, the views expressed in
his opinion in the Hardenburg case were a correct interpretation of Section 9096. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice
Angstman, who in several prior decisions written7 or concurred'
in by the Justice, had upheld the interpretation of Section 9096
set forth in the Interstate Lumber Co. case, now was convinced
that the decision in that case was wrong insofar as it declared
that "may" as used in the contract and tort provision of Section
9096 means "must."
In view of the confusion that exists as to the status of the
Montana law on this subject, perhaps the writer of this comment could set forth his conclusions without adding to the confusion to a greater extent.
The limitations and qualifications placed upon the right to
try a contract action in the county where the contract was to be
performed are vulnerable to the same criticism that Mr. Justice
Adair directed* at the court's construction of Section 9096 in the
Interstate Lumber Co. case, that the limitations and qualifications are judicial legislation, for the legislature, in granting the
right, did not so limit it.
It can hardly be disputed that every contract has a place
for performance, and in determining the place for performance
the courts should look to the intention of the parties in the light
of the surrounding circumstances and the pertinent code provisions, and when the defendant moves for a change of place of
trial on the grounds that the county where the action on the contract was commenced is not the proper county for performance
"Kolberg v. Griener (1932) 91 Mont. 509, 8 P. (2d) 799.
"Stewart v. First National Bank and Trust Co. (1933) 93 Mont. 390,
18 P.(2d) 801; BenJamin v. Crick (1933) 95 Mont. 390, 26 P.(2d) 369;
Johnson v. Crick (1933) 95 Mont. 388, 26 P.(2) 369; Colbert Drug Co.
v. Electrical Products Consolidated (1937) 106 Mont. 11, 74 P.(2d) 437;
Thomas v. Cloyd (1940) 120 Mont. 34, 100 P. (2d) 938.
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and place of trial, it is for the court to decide, upon a proper
showing by the defendant, whether the contract was to be performed in the county to which the defendant seeks to have the
cause removed.
As an original problem of statutory construction it would
seem that there is merit to the contention that all of the provisions of Section 9096 should apply to actions upon contracts
and actions for torts. Where both mandatory and directory
verbs are used in the same statute, or in the same section, it is a
fair inference that the legislature realized the difference in
meaning and intended that the verbs used should carry with
them their ordinary meanings. Especially is this true where
"shall" and "may" are used in close juxtaposition in a statutory provision under circumstances that would indicate that a
different treatment is intended for the predicates following
them.' The decision in the Interstate Lumber Co. case gave no
satisfactory reason why a county in which a contract or tort
action is commenced could not be a proper county for place of
trial within the provisions of Sections 9097 and 9098, if the permissive auxiliary "may" carried with it its ordinary meaning.
If construed as a proper county for trial, even though the provision is permissive in character, the sentence would not become
meaningless when read in conjunction with Sections 9097 and
9098.
However, there is much to be said for Mr. Chief Justice
Johnson's contention that the bench and bar are entitled to some
degree of certainty in the court's interpretation of the statute.
If the bench and bar have been satisfied for twenty-six years
with the construction placed on the statute by the Interstate
Lumber Co. case that there is but one proper place for trial of
these classes of actions, the court, for the purpose of certainty
in procedure, should adhere to that construction. If that construction is what the bench and bar and litigants want, the
statute should be amended so that its language coincides with
that construction and the contract and tort provision should
be placed in the venue statutes ahead of the general provision
set forth in the first sentence of Section 9096.
George W. Horkan.
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